This study investigates the discursive peregrinations of the 'Han' category in the writings of the Chinese revolutionary, theoretician and activist Qu Qiubai. In the papers he wrote at the beginning of the 1930s dealing with the questions of language and writing, the author made singular use of the concept 'Han' to talk about the language/writing of the 'Han' (Hanzi, Hanyu) as a racial or ethnic group (Hanzu). Qu elaborated a discourse which articulated and mobilized, sometimes in a contradictory manner, the 'Han' category both as a 'race' and as a social class. Going beyond the race/class dialectic, I will try to show that these texts question the territorial, cultural and ethnic boundaries of 'China' and its homogeneity. Following this argument, this paper demonstrates how Qu's attempt to define 'Chinese language(s)' helps us to elucidate the complex articulation between China as a discursive and spatial category, the 'Han' category, and the other nationalities in the Chinese space. By questioning the homogeneity of the linguistic identity of China, using the word zhongguohua, Qu Qiubai unveiled an unstable and fragile imaginary relative to China and its socalled majority ethnic group, the Han.
Introduction
The primary aim of this paper is to investigate the discursive peregrinations of the category 'Han' in the writings of the Chinese revolutionary theoretician and activist Qu Qiubai (1899 Qiubai ( -1935 .
1 This paper makes no attempt to deal with the theoretical and political work carried out by Qu Qiubai as the former leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the 1920s, but focuses rather, on the texts concerning cultural and linguistic issues that he wrote at the beginning of the thirties after retiring from the political leadership of the CCP. The writings of Qu Qiubai as a cultural critic must not be dissociated from his previous position as a political leader.
I intend to analyze, through Qu's discourse on language and writing, how the category minzu (nation/ethnicity/race), and more specifically, the idea of a Hanzu or Han minzu are deployed and integrated in his theoretical writing. In his writing of the early 1930s, the author made a singular use of the signifier 'Han' to talk about the language/writing of the Han (hanzi, hanyu) as that of a racial or ethnic group understood as hanzu. Narrating the history of the cultural hegemony of the Han in Asia and criticizing the policy of assimilation (tonghua), Qu elaborated a discourse which articulated and mobilized, sometimes in a contradictory manner, the category Han both as a 'race' and as a social class.
Going beyond the race/class dialectic, we will try to show that these texts question the territorial, cultural and ethnic boundaries of 'China' and its homogeneity. Even if the author integrated the Han category in his discourse, I argue that his use of the notion in theoretical works dealing with the linguistic identity of China tends to deconstruct the modern invention of this homogeneous ethnic community in two different but associated ways: the assertion of a linguistic multiplicity within the Han group and at the same time the identification of the traditional Han language and writing (hanzi, hanyu) with a dominant social class which overcomes this internal diversity.
Qu Qiubai and the modern tradition of the category 'Han' As Dru Gladney said, the notion of Hanzu or Han minzu in the sense of an ethnic community as the cohesive body of the nation is 'an entirely modern phenomenon, arising with the shift from empire to nation'. 3 The nationalist ideology in China, embodying the will to invent a political nation-state, goes back to the beginning of the twentieth century as a consequence of, and as an answer to, the Western imperial domination: nation as a concept and as a political form was to be used by Chinese intellectuals to build a new and strong state able to compete among the family of nations. The last hundred years have witnessed the political construction of the Chinese nation-state, and this nationalist project has been sustained by the voluntarist constitution of a cultural and linguistic homogeneity. Even if, as in all nationalist narratives, this history/story functions as a fiction, the nationalist ideology which invented boundaries between China and the outer world (these being not only political and state boundaries but also cultural, linguistic and ethnic ones) is nowadays deeply inscribed in the Chinese collective imaginary. In the modern construction of the Chinese nation, the Han, as an ethnic/racial community, functions as a major component of the discursive construction of the nation as one and homogeneous. The category Han is now an integral part of the Chinese collective consciousness and corresponds, in the Chinese society, to what led by Li Lisan during the spring of 1930, Qu, in accordance here with Mao Zedong, opposed the hegemonic Comintern's line led by Wang Ming within the CCP. Because he did not strongly criticize Li Lisan's 'adventurist' line, Qu was excluded from the Central Committee in 1931. His theoretical writings on culture and language were produced on the eve of these repetitive political losses. In criticizing the 'europeanized' May fourth literature, seeking a revolutionary popular culture and invoking a common vernacular language, Qu displaced the political battle on the cultural front and induced the communists to grasp the cultural leadership. On Qu Qiubai as a cultural critic, see Villard, Le Gramsci chinois, passim; Pickowicz, Marxist Literary Thought in China, passim; Liu, Aesthetic and Marxism, [60] [61] [62] [63] [64] [65] [66] [67] [68] [69] [70] the Greco-French social philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis called a 'social imaginary signification '. 4 From the first conceptualization of a 'Han race' by the anti-Manchu revolutionaries to the invention of the 'Han nationality' by the communists, the homogeneity of the Han community has never been questioned by Chinese nationbuilders. At the same time, the fact that the territory referred to as China under the Qing dynasty greatly exceeds the physical habitat of the so-called Han, obligated Chinese nation-builders -both nationalists and communists -to integrate in different ways the inner others in their national narratives. The complex palimpsest of the narration of the 'Chinese nation' is composed of different strata. The polysemy and ambiguities of the notion of minzu is the result of multiple intertextualities between the Japanese (minzoku), various version of the concept of nation in different European languages (at first German, but also English, French and Russian with natsiya and narodnost), and Chinese translations, besides being the consequence of the re-invention and transformation of the meanings of minzu within the Chinese intellectual and political space according to various political and ideological orientations of the speakers. It is acknowledged that the first occurrences of the word minzu appeared at the end of the nineteenth century when theoreticians of Chinese nationalism, both reformist and revolutionary, borrowed this word from the Japanese. 5 The word had been constructed by the Japanese to translate the modernWestern notion of the 'nation' when the idea of nation came along with the European nineteenth century 'scientific' discourse of the race struggle. In the political context of the anti-Manchu discourse developed by revolutionaries at the end of the Qing dynasty, notions such as minzu and Hanzu had a racialist connotation in the texts of nationalist propagandists such as Zhang Binglin and later Sun Yat-sen. 6 The connotations of the concept of Hanzu in the writings of a Chinese intellectual in the 1930s cannot be understood without examining the semantic history of the signifiers of the community -that is national, ethnic and racial. The imaginary of the 'nation' and its boundaries is a recent phenomenon in China, but it is interesting to note that in Qu's texts we can already find different theoretical and textual traditions which give it a polysemic sense often veiled by the translation of signifiers such as hanzi, hanyu, Hanzu, Zhongguo, minzu, and so on.
As a Marxist, Qu Qiubai would probably have contested an essentialist, biological, race-based definition of Han, it is however obvious that, like his contemporaries, he had integrated the notion of a Han ethnic majority as a dominant discursive category through which to read China's politics.
7 In Qu's texts, minzu is related to the Soviet theoretical tradition concerning 'nationalities' and 'national question' policies. This intertextual track is strengthened by the fact that Qu spent many years in Moscow as a journalist and as the CCP's representative at 4 Castoriadis, Domaines de l'homme, 280.
5
See Dikotter, The Discourse of Race in Modern China, passim; Weiner, 'The Invention of Identity, Race and Nation in Pre-War Japan', 96-117; Thoraval, 'Sur le concept chinois de ''nation'': la de´cision terminologique du maoı¨sme', 56-57; Thoraval, 'L'usage de la notion d' 'ethnicite´' applique´e a`l'univers culturel chinois', 44-59; Fang, 'Lun jindai sixiangshi shang de ''minzu'', ''nation'' yu ''Zhongguo'''. A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture [. . .] . A nation is not merely a historical category but a historical category belonging to a definite epoch, the epoch of rising capitalism.
9
In this regard, minzu as a community of the capitalist stage identified by the 'four common' criteria of the Stalinist definition is explicit in the author's political texts written in the 1920s on the so-called national and colonial question. When he mentions the 'ruoxiao minzu', or 'weak and small nationalities', he refers to the ethno-cultural communities living within political entities such as the Soviet Union or China.
10
The set-phrase 'shaoshu minzu', or 'minority nationalities', which had a Comintern origin, already appears in the communist party literature of the 1920s.
11 The term was used to refer to the non-Han communities within the Chinese space, including refugees from various countries and foreign residents in the concessions (Europeans, Philippians, Indians, Vietnamese). 12 We must mention here that, at least until 1935, in the Chinese Communists' official texts, the concept of minzu was also used when referring to the Chinese nation as a whole as in the expression 'Zhonghua minzu', but in this case, the community was limited to the Han ethnic group. 13 From 1938 on, the meaning of the expression 'Zhonghua minzu' evolved and became more precise through the writings of communist theoretician Yang Song, who cut off the long historical continuity of the Chinese nation by writing that 'Zhonghua minzu' was only a modern category produced by of the amalgamation of different people through history.
14 Later, Mao Zedong contested this version by reasserting the ancient historical roots of the so-called 'Zhonghua minzu'. 15 Qu uses the word minzu both for 'small' nationalities, and for the Han, but we must bear in mind that in the theoretical framework of the communists, these communities were not located at the same historical stage. In accordance with the communist literature of that time, we can say that in most cases the Han minzu was seen as the majority, as overlapping with China, and as historically advanced compared to the other nationalities in the Marxist socio-economic framework.
My purpose here is to question the position of the Hanzu or Han minzu as an ethnic category in relation to Zhongguo or China seen as a territory, a political entity 8 Stalin, Works, 300-382. Ibid, 307, 313. 10 See Qu Qiubai's texts in Minzu wenti wenxian huibian: 'Shiyue geming yu ruoxiao minzu' 62; 'Lieningzhuyi yu Zhongguo de guomin geming', 71; 'Zhongguo geming de zhenglun wenti', 79. 11 Liu, Frontier Passages, 41, 68. 12 Minzu wenti wenxian huibian, 109. 13 Liu, 'Communism, Nationalism, Ethnicism, and China's National Question', 137. 14 Minzu wenti wenxian huibian, 766. 15 Liu, 'Communism, Nationalism, Ethnicism, and China's National Question ', 137. and also a language in the writings of the author and to point out the contradictions or ambiguities in his discourse. As I mentioned earlier, the Han question was not the main concern of Qu's texts in the 1930s, but it was nevertheless a prevalent element in his discourse.
The author wrote extensively on the question of a common language for China which would not be a 'national language' or 'state language'. 16 His critics focused on the linguistic project of the invention of a standardized and uniform Mandarin-based 'national language' (guoyu). Qu was promoting the concept of putonghua, or 'common language', as something ontologically different from the notion of 'national language', or state-imposed standardized common language. For him, putonghua was to be the result of a natural (non-coercive) process of amalgamation and Bakhtinian hybridizing of multiple languages within the Chinese space through capitalist development and the economic integration of all territories.
17 Commoners, and especially deterritorialized proletariat coming from different regions, would grasp and transform the old dominant major Mandarin language and contribute to invent this so-called utopian putonghua. Qu insists on the fact that, during this long period of transition, people should always be able to use their vernacular local languages -not only those of the 'minorities nationalities' -but also the different languages spoken within the Han community. After 1956, the concept of putonghua was used in the People's Republic of China (PRC), while Taiwan chose the initial Republican Period name 'guoyu', or 'national language'. 18 It is obvious that the official meaning of putonghua in the PRC was only the idea of a state language and had nothing to do with Qu's postnational, immanent, and utopian notion of a common language.
In his texts, the author identified different linguistic communities referring simultaneously to the languages of the Hanzu and to those of other nationalities. I believe that the discursive relation between the Han, the nationalities and Zhongguo in Qu's thinking can be clarified by focusing on the question of language. It is a way to elucidate how a Chinese revolutionary in the 1930s understood and imagined the Chinese identity, that is to say China in its political, spatial, cultural and linguistic dimensions, by revealing some ambiguities within his discourse and identifying questions on his thinking concerning the relation between the Han, the 'others' and China. Are the Han located on the same level as the 'others' in his imaginary of China? Is the Han category a synonym of Zhongguo in his texts? Does the heterogeneity and diversity of the 'others' necessarily imply a homogeneous and unique Han majority?
The Han as China I would first like to insist on the arguments in Qu's essays, which give credit to the habitual thesis according to which the Han category is synonymous with Zhongguo and, which consequently establishes the other nationalities as being outside this relationship. Let me quote here the author in a critique of the assimilationist position (tongwen zhengce) held by the poet and May Fourth movement activist Liu Dabai (1880 -1932 . Qu aimed at proving that China, unlike in the past, no longer had the 16 See Qu, Wenxue Bian 3, passim. 17 Villard, Le Gramsci chinois, 243-309; Villard, 'Europeanized Culture and Intercultural Questions in 1930's China', 221-37. 18 Seybolt and Kuei-Ke Chiang, Language Reform in China, 25. power and the dominant position -economic and by extension cultural -which would have allowed her to impose an assimilationist policy on 'alien races' (yizu). The dominant imperialist nations were now European countries and they were imposing their cultures on Asia and notably China's old vassal states. It is interesting to notice that in this passage Zhongguo and the Han are conflated:
In the historical past, the Hanzu of China was the most culturally advanced nation. In this last sentence, what is intended by Zhongguo is a political space or entity and the other 'ethnicities' refer to ethno-cultural communities. The author clearly sets these two different types of communities apart, and the relationship between Zhongguo, as a political power, and the nationalities allows no confusion in this quotation. But the situation gets more complicated and ambiguous when we try to understand how the third term of the conversation -that is to say the Hanzu or Han minzu -came to be included within the discursive relationship between Zhongguo and its 'inner others'. Qu uses the words Hanzu and Zhongguo de Hanzu to talk about a dominant culture -symbolized here by the characters Han -which deeply influenced many Asian countries in the past. Later in the essay, as he deals with the question of the assimilation of the 'alien races' (yizu) (Xinjiang, Mongolia and Tibet), he uses the word Zhongguo and conflates this term with the notion of Hanzu. In the same way, it seems clear that in the last question quoted above replacing minzu by Hanzu would sound like a non-sense: Does China still want to apply this kind of [assimilationist] policy to tackle the Hanzu? It is obvious that in Qu's imaginary, the idea of China, as limited to the Han community, has been partly integrated. Qu gives a particular status to the Han nationality, which finds its origin in the nineteenth-century nationalist invention of the category of the Han as a majority ethnic/racial community in China. This example follows the Communist party's position on nationalities, which pointed to the possibility of future independence for non-Han nationalities on the grounds that they were not naturally included within the Chinese nation. The right of selfdetermination, or 'minzu de zijuequan', for ethnic minorities, including, at that time, Manchus, Mongolians, Tibetans, Hui, Miao, Yao, and Yi, but also Koreans from Manchuria, Taiwanese from Fujian and people from Xinjiang, is explicitly spelled out in the communist party documents at the end of the 1920s. 20 The 1931 Constitution of the Jiangxi Soviet explicitly confirmed this position:
The regime of the Chinese Soviet recognized the right to self-determination for the minority nationalities within the Chinese territory. It recognized the right of secession 19 Qu, Wenxue Bian 3, 207. 20 Minzu wenti wenxian huibian, 87, 90, 97, 109. We can notice here that the definition of shaoshu minzu was very broad even concerning the populations which would be included within the Han nationality today like the so-called category 'Taiwanese from Fujian'. from China and the right to declare its independence for every weak and small nationalities.
21
It is also coherent with Qu's position in his political texts written in the 1920s, where he made clear that for him 'Zhongguo minzu' only included the Hanren, and within the Han themselves Qu said that the commoners were the sole representatives of the Chinese nation. 22 Borrowing the words of Hannah Arendt in her work on nationalism, we could argue, in a performative manner, that the creation of the modern majority of the Han category transformed the people identified as Han into 'Chinese by birth' while on the other hand, the people in the non-Han category would only be 'Chinese by law'.
23
China as a language, China as a space Saying that in Qu Qiubai's texts China is synonymous with the Han, would be too simplistic a resolution of the complexity of the relations between the category Han, the nationalities and Zhongguo as a spatial, political and historical entity. I will now go a little further by questioning the relationship and differences between Qu's imaginary of the territorial and linguistic Chinese/Han space. The author recurrently used the expression Zhongguo yuzu, or 'Chinese linguistic family', as a synonym for 'the languages of the Han'. As mentioned above, Qu insisted in saying that the non-Han nationalities were not included in the notion of Zhongguohua:
We can say that the Chinese language means the Chinese family of languages because within the Chinese [Zhongguo] space, -besides the languages of different nationalities such as Miao, Li, Yi, Tibetan or Mongol, there are also numerous varieties Han nationality language.
24
In one sentence only, we can spot a double use of the concept Zhongguo: first, Zhongguo as a geographic territory in Zhongguo jingnei; and second, Zhongguo defining a linguistic community in Zhongguohua, where the notion only refers to a limited Han ethnic group. On the other hand, Zhongguo as a territorial entity subsumes different nationalities or minzu including the Han. The'geographic concept' of Zhongguo jingnei implies the idea of an inner and an outer China, and the term used here also refers to the old Qing dynasty's imperial territory. If a Chinese map involving a sovereign territory with fixed and precisely delimited boundaries belongs to a strictly modern imaginary 25 , it is a historical fact that the Qing had already established boundaries with their neighboring states but its 'frontiers policy operated within 'zones' rather than along 'lines '. 26 This meaning of Zhongguo as a political territory including different nationalities is confirmed in another text by Qu where he notes that '[a]s a nation, China is not simply the Han nationality; there are also the Hui, the Tibetans, the Mongols, the Li, 21 Minzu wenti wenxian huibian, 166; Berge`re, 'La politique des minorite´s nationales en Chine', 407. 22 Qu, Zhengzhi Lilun Bian 3, 79-82; Liu, Frontiers Passages, 45, 91 . 23 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 231. 24 Qu, Wenxue Bian 3, 276. 25 Culp, Articulating Citizenship, 74. 26 Liu, Frontiers Passages, 15. the Miao, the Yi'. 27 The vision of China as a multinational state is in apparent contradiction with his Han-China conception. Therefore, we can wonder whether minzu has the meaning of a political community here as in the expression Zhonghua minzu. If we consider language as a major ethnic criterion we can say that the author made a distinction between an ethnic Han China, and a territorial, historical, imperial China overcoming this ethnic identity. This split within a Chinese space can be read as the classic distinction made by the communists, and by Qu in his texts, between 'China proper' or Zhongguo benbu and 'frontier regions' or Zhongguo jiangbu. As Liu Xiaoyuan remarked, if this distinction was used by the communists within the Marxist economic theoretical framework, it still echoed older 'in-grained' conceptions of the 'frontier administration ', or bianzheng. 28 This internal boundary between 'proper' and 'frontier' China also corresponded to ethnic boundaries between the Han and the non-Han read in terms of historical differences, that is to say economic differences, since the Han were considered as advanced compared to the 'alien races' (yizhong minzu): 'When applying the standard Marxist politicaleconomic analysis to China's inter-ethnic situation, the CCP made a stark contrast between the burgeoning capitalist China proper (benbu) and the 'nomadic, primitive' non-Han frontiers (jiangbu)'.
29
The deconstruction of Han ethnicity The distinction between the homogeneous Han, as the Chinese proper, and the heterogeneous others within a global Chinese space or Zhongguo jingnei covering both territories is, however, put into question by the author's emphasis on the plurality of languages or dialects spoken within the Han community itself. The author gives a cohesive identity to the Han with the notion of linguistic family, he however recurrently insists on the inner diversity within this 'family' and includes in it all the languages spoken inside the 'Han' Chinese world such as Shanghainese, Cantonese, the language of Beijing, which were all subsumed under the concept of a 'Chinese linguistic family', a notion which means, according to the author, Zhongguohua or 'Chinese languages'. 30 In many essays, as he criticizes the guoyu project, Qu considers a national Mandarin-based language which would be imposed on the Han population as a violence committed against the diversity of idioms spoken in China:
A policy of so-called Chinese (Zhongguohua) 'national language (guoyu) unification' must absolutely not be applied to them [the nationalities]-just as a policy of coercive [linguistic] unification cannot be applied to the numerous dialects (fangyan) of the Han themselves. 31 27 Qu, Wenxue Bian 3, 305. 28 Liu, 'Communism, Nationalism, Ethnicism, and China's National Question ', 123. 29 Ibid. 30 Qu, Wenxue Bian 3, 276. The author made a cartography of the linguistic groups which partially refers to the contemporary linguists' dialectal categories (See Alleton, 'Les territoires de la langue', 47-52). Except the Mandarin group, Qu mentions six language families corresponding to different regions of south-west China: Beijing, Jiangnan, Jiangbei, Fujian, Guangdong, Lianghu. He did not mention the Hakka language and the Gan language from the Jiangxi province. 31 Qu, Wenxue Bian 3, 305. In another text, he also made this critical statement about the political function of a 'national language' within multinational states:
In the situation of a multinational country where the dominant majority imposes its idiom as the 'national language' as a way to assimilate the others and adopts a coercive policy against the minorities languages, the 'national language' is only a weapon to oppress the weakest nations.
32
It is a fact that the homogeneity of the Han majority has seldom been questioned either by Chinese nationalist intellectuals or by 'scientific' scholars. Dru Gladney notes that 'discussions of China generally take cultural homogeneity for granted' and argues that 'there is a tremendous ethnic diversity among its 'official' minority nationalities, but also that there are equally important cultural differences among China's majority population, identified as the Han people'. 33 Significantly, the division between the Han as the Chinese ethnic group, and the other nationalities, does not imply in Qu's texts the unity of the Han. Qu goes even further in rewriting history and imagining the past fragmentation of China into numerous different nations and the constitution of multiple literary languages within the territory. He, nevertheless, insists on two preconditions for the possible realization of this historical fiction, that is the initial development of capitalism in China and a phonetic written system: If capitalism had been developed from East Asia, the economic conditions for a fragmentation of the Chinese nation would have been settled. If every region in China had adopted a phonetic script and instituted an independent written language, we would have seen the development of a Beijing language, a Shanghai language and so on instead of the Chinese language.
34
According to Qu, the 'Chinese family of languages' can be compared to the 'Latin family of languages' and, in this perspective, he insists that there were as many differences between the European languages as there were between the Chinese 'Han' languages. If we compare this imaginary to China's contemporary situation, it is relatively explicit that today in the multinational People's Republic, the so-called official 'minority nationalities' or shaoshu minzu function, in their diversity, as the other of the unique, homogenized Han majority. If, since 1949, the multinational dimension of the Chinese state has always been stated, the Han majority was never questioned. I would say that although it cannot be denied that Qu Qiubai still relied upon the category of the Hanzu as an ethnic community and imagined it through a Marxist-Leninist socio-economic framework, at the same time, dealing with the question of language, which is one of the most important criteria in defining ethnicity, he repeatedly noted the extreme diversity among the Han and in a sense deconstructed an essentialist vision of the Han community as an ethnic group. Although the concept of Han remains a category often used by the author as if it was coterminous with 'China', in contesting the linguistic homogeneity of this community Qu Qiubai tends indirectly to weaken the Han-based identity of the Chinese modern nation.
32 Ibid, 138, 169. 33 Gladney, Dislocating China, 6 . 34 Qu, Wenxue Bian 3, 276.
The Han as a class
In taking into account the internal diversity of the Han, I argue, that the author helps us to imagine in a singular way the traditional relationship between the apparent Han majority, the ancient 'alien races' or modern 'minority nationalities' and the old vassal states (shuguo and keguo) outside the Chinese imperial boundaries. Having taken for granted the linguistic diversity within 'China proper', Qu articulates this reality with the construction of a historical meta-narrative involving a Han/Chinese culture (Hanzi, Hanwen, Hanyu) which formerly imposed its domination within the space named 'Tianxia' that is to say a more or less large territory around the middle point of the Empire. 35 When narrating the ancient 'Chinese' cultural domination over Asia, the author stands, unsurprisingly, on a historical materialist point of view and insists on the 'Hanzu' cultural domination as the consequence of its position as an 'advanced nation' in political-economical terms. In other words, if Japan or South-East Asian nations used Han characters and Han writing, it was, according to Qu, the result of an economic domination and of the political superiority of the Han:
In ancient times, the advanced economic development of the Hanzu of China produced the writing system of the Chinese gentry, and local gentry of backwards East Asian nations [minzu] became the students of the Hanzu gentry.
36
This cultural and linguistic hegemony was not read by Qu as a consequence of a race struggle, as the domination of one nation or ethnicity over another, it was rather seen as the hegemony of a social class, which was the bureaucracy and the gentry of the Chinese imperial state. That is, the common, at least in appearance, cultural and linguistic identity (Confucian culture and Classical Chinese) in Asia was interpreted as the hegemony of a dominant class, even if this class was part of an ethnic community, here the Han. It is not surprising to hear a Marxist using the argument of the class struggle to narrate historical evolution. But the shift, in its interpretation, from ethnicity to social class has profound implications on the way he imagines China and its identity, especially its cultural and linguistic identity. As he writes on the relations between this dominant class and the local populations (minzhong, pingmin), we can again witness a destabilization of the ethno-cultural frontiers or essential differences between a Han and a non-Han cultural space. Hence the fact, that in the theoretical imaginary of Qu Qiubai, the cultural and linguistic diversity under the imperial bureaucracy cannot be understood only in terms of 'Proper China' and 'Frontiers China' or Han and non-Han populations and territory. This inner traditional frontier is here partly erased because Qu considers that the diversity under the dominant class also exists within the Han territory itself. Let me quote Qu's construction of a fascinating comparative perspective which helps us to understand his geopolitical imaginary:
During the Middle Ages, the European aristocratic class from different states were all using Latin while the languages of the people within these states were all local vernaculars. [. . .] In the Far East in ancient times, the gentries of different kingdoms 35 Qu, Wenxue Bian 3, 206, 209. 36 Ibid. 207. used the Han written language, however the peoples of these different states spoke their own local idioms [. . .] Over the entirety of China proper, scholars of the various provinces all used the same Han classical language while what the ordinary people of China's various provinces spoke was the Beijing dialect, Cantonese, the Shanghainese and so on . . .
37
It is not my purpose here to assess the scientific credibility of Qu's historical reading and knowledge, but to track the way he imagines and articulates spaces, populations, languages and cultures to inform his discursive (de)construction of the Chinese nation's identity. Qu develops a comparative approach articulating three different socio-historical and political spaces so as to contest the cultural assimilationist discourse, which claimed that in the past China had always been able to acculturate alien races, owing to its uniform Han writing system. We can nevertheless notice some basic differences between these three spaces: Qu uses the concept of 'China proper' and thus naturally implies the existence of another and distinct part of the Chinese territory. Identifying local identities under these geographical spaces, he also mentions 'sheng' or province in the Chinese example and deploys the term 'guo' or country when dealing with Europe and Asia.
However, the numerous arguments the author puts forward in order to compare the European and the Chinese situations tend to deconstruct China as a nation, even when reduced to the Han community. He objects to a Chinese or Han linguistic identity by insisting on the fact that this superficial unity (biaomian de shangceng de tongyi) and cultural homogeneity was made by the 'ruling aristocratic bureaucracy' (guanliao guizu tongzhi).
38 He reads China's linguistic differences in a vertical manner: multiplicity of local idioms among the people, unity of language and culture in the dominant class. We may find here the influence of class reductionism in the analysis of national culture borrowed from Lenin's thinking. The Russian theoretician 'argued repeatedly that in every nation there are two cultures: that of the bourgeoisie and reactionary forces, and that of the proletariat'. 39 In this respect, Lenin differs from the position of Stalin who states the identity of culture as a defining part of the word 'nation'. Qu Qiubai reproduced this scheme at a different socio-historical moment and asserted that within the Hanzu there were at least two linguistico-cultural levels: that of the gentry and imperial bureaucracy and that of the common people. Thus, the cultural and linguistic hegemony of the Han nation was nothing but the domination of a class.
Frank Diko¨tter reminds us that the reformist thinker of the late Qing Empire Liang Qichao 'rearticulated traditional social hierarchies into a new racial taxonomy'. 40 Similarly, Balibar (following Foucault) noticed that the old classical myths of race have all something to do with class distinction and especially with aristocratic identity. 41 In reading the word 'class' behind the word 'race', it is as if the texts of Qu were inverting the process by which these two concepts had been linked.
37 Ibid. 209. 38 Ibid. 276. 39 Nimni, Marxism and Nationalism, 86. 40 Dikotter, The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan, 16. 41 Balibar and Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class, 89. was not part of his political agenda. One of the major differences between Qu's perception of China's future and Mao Zedong's approach is crystallized in the question of sovereignty and national construction. Qu was a revolutionary imbedded in an internationalist vision, which is looking forward to the overcoming of national boundaries. On the contrary, Mao Zedong, especially after the Japanese invasion, based his cultural and political thinking on the nation-building project. Qu was neither seeking homogeneity, whether it be linguistic, cultural or racial, nor wanting to construct this national identity with the 'ideological state apparatus'.
The concept of 'fictive ethnicity' enables us to insist on the productive dimension of discourses and representations as a way to invent an ethnic community. On the contrary, in the dominant and complex academic debate about the historical shift from a cultural China to a national China during late Qing and early Republican Periods, the 'Chinese ethnic community', or Han ethnic identity, has often been taken for granted. 45 As if under the classical distinction between the culturallydefined (culturalism) or nationally-defined (nationalism) Chinese and the Others, it was still possible, through the category of the Han ethnic group (often called the 'Chinese' in English), to identify a stable, unquestionable and nearly natural nucleus. By interrogating the homogeneity of the Han and also erasing the boundaries between Han and non-Han groups under the hegemony of a class, Qu Qiubai, probably not consciously, took part in the weakening of the Han ethnicity narrative. 
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